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Abstract
I thank my colleagues for both their generosity and engaging reactions to my book. It is
interesting, as well, to see the variations in the readings they give to the text. Churchill’s
initial view that I am not offering ontology is useful, as it speaks to a pervasive concern
within the other commentaries that I am dismissing or dismantling cherished concepts of
agency, experience, responsibility – and indeed, physical reality. I underscore that the
conception of relational being – just as these concepts – is a social construction. I do not
wish to debate ontology, but rather, to explore how such constructions function – for
good or ill – in everyday life.
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Relational Being in Question: A Reply to my Colleagues
Perhaps I should not be surprised at the rich, creative, and sophisticated array of
responses to which I have been treated by my colleagues. Here we find just the kind of
work that has established their quite significant reputations. What does surprise and
please me so very much is the grace with which they have challenged various proposals
in my book. The scholarly world is so wedded to a tradition favoring individual
dominance through the destruction of the other. In contrast, these papers constitute what
one might see as “best practices” for future scholarly interchange. For me they are indeed
relational being in action.
I also found myself fascinated by the considerable range of replies to my work.
My interlocutors were each unique in what they viewed as significant or problematic
about my writing—or, one might say, each read a different book. Yet my fascination
soon gave way to a pleasurable sense of vindication of one of the central messages of the
volume: our actions never contain meaning in themselves. All meaning derives from the
coordination of actions. My book will never speak for itself; it comes alive (or not)
through the supplementary action of my readers. These readers have certainly brought me
to life, and I am very grateful.
In my reading of Scott Churchill’s (2011) sophisticated contribution, I found
myself delighted: Here was someone who understood the unspoken assumptions in the
paper in ways almost identical to my own. My writing surely has an “ontological ring” to
it, as Churchill points out, setting out a world of ostensible realities into which the reader
may enter. As he further proposes, I proceed to construct this world out of a wide range
of observations, experiences, logics, and so on. In this sense, I proceed as a bricoleur,
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attempting to blend whatever resources are at hand to generate a sense of the real. We do
not have, then, an a priori ontological commitment, one that stands in an antagonistic
relationship to the many alternatives available and in the making. Rather, I present here a
way of understanding our world, with potentials to be explored and developed, and
clearly, I view these potentials as enormously valuable to the human condition.
At the same time, Churchill’s commentary about “equiprimordiality” in
ontological theory stands as a significant challenge to my account of relationality. As he
points out, it is impossible to select out isolated components of the relational process, or
to point to any component not included in the process. “In the end,” as he says, “one lifts
the whole carpet” (Churchill, 2011, p. ?). I struggle with this issue throughout the
volume. I want to speak of relational process, but inevitably I must employ a language of
nouns—of elements, or separable entities. To speak of the entire relational process, the
“whole carpet” leaves one with no words. In effect, here is a case in which our linguistic
resources obfuscate the attempt at intelligibility. In the Prologue of the volume I ask the
reader’s indulgence, and to understand that wherever I talk about individual persons, for
example, I am using a “place holder” for a subsequent account in which the person would
be inseparable from relationship. In the final chapter I explore the mystery attending to
“the whole carpet.” Herein lies a dialogue that must be continued.
In my first reading of Joshua Clegg’s (2011) evocative contribution, I was
bemused. Here was a commentator taking me to task for my writing within “the tradition
of Enlightenment rationality” (Clegg, 2011, p. ?). How often, I thought, it has been the
other way around, with critics finding my constructionist views all too postmodern. Then,
I reconsidered: there are certainly ways in which he is correct. There are many forms of
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argument in the book that indeed use the modernist discourses of reason and evidence to
make their mark. I am working here very much in the rationalist tradition of generating
compelling coherence. At the same time, there are subtle differences between the way a
modernist would understand this achievement and my own. For the modernist, the aim is
the “well wrought urn,” that is a final logic or rational system, one towering over its
predecessors and defending itself against discreditors. For me the “urn” has a different
shape. I do not seek a final word, nor the displacement of all that has preceded. I am after
meaningful dialogue. Thus, since many of my readers will indeed appreciate the
modernist penchant for coherent reason and evidence, this is one discourse through which
I may reach them. Yet this is but one of the voices to appear in the work. There are many
others: biographical, visual, poetic, dialogic and the like. Each invites another community
of readers to the table.
Then the question emerges, from what standpoint is Clegg critiquing
Enlightenment rationality, if not from the Postmodern? An early answer is to be found in
his championing of the “mysteries of lived experience.” I do take up the issue of lived
experience in my book, attempting to show how experience is not separate and distinct
from relationship (as individualists and romanticists might hold), but indeed is a
manifestation of relational process. However, Clegg’s critique seems to represent a
tradition that might be characterized as pre-modern spiritualist. He speaks, for example,
of a “transcendent rupture of all reason,” which includes “the sacredness of obligation
and responsibility” (Clegg, 2011, p. ?) I scarcely want to abandon the rich array of
potentials emerging from such a tradition. In fact, I find a certain affinity with the ends
favored by Clegg, with the difference primarily one of means. Clegg seems to rely on the
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unreasoned assertion of some transcendent presence, that which we simply must
recognize in order to realize an ethical life. In terms of Churchill’s essay, he is doing
ontology. In contrast, I rely on various traditions of discourse to reach the point, in the
closing chapters of the book, at which I cannot justify the central concept of relational
being. My “best reasoning” simply collapses in its attempt to “capture” the relational
process from which the concept emerges. My response, not unlike Clegg’s, is to invite a
collective responsibility for sustaining the generative process of relating itself. Clegg and
I join hands in viewing this as a condition of peace.
In their beautifully crafted paper, Sugarman and Martin (2011) give voice to a
tradition to which I am also drawn. The concept of human agency is central to the
humanist tradition, and it is one that few of us would wish to relinquish. Nor would it be
a contribution to human well-being to capitulate to the view, implied in so much
contemporary psychology, that we are incapable of escaping the determining press of
heredity and environment. Sugarman and Martin are sophisticated and creative defenders
of the agentic tradition and, particularly in the current context of neuro-reductionism, we
should all be grateful for this. Nevertheless, I wonder if their dissatisfaction with my
seeming dismissal of the agentic self is not overdrawn. I say this first because the
constructionist logic of my book clearly states that I am not attempting to eradicate
traditional conceptions of the person. Relational being is offered as an augmentation—an
addition to our potentials—as opposed to a denial. It is fruitless to debate whether we
“really and truly” are free agents or not, but many of our ways of life do rely on such a
discourse. The question for me is thus whether we wish to sustain all such ways of life,
and if not, whether we must then capitulate to the deleterious implications of an
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otherwise hegemonic determinism. I invite Sugarman and Martin to join me in such
questioning.
At the same time, I also wonder whether my colleagues and I might not find some
common ground in a more relational way of conceptualizing human agency. Why is it
essential to separate human agency from relational process, placing it somehow above
and superior, as Sugarman and Martin do? Why must we sustain a concept of self that
ultimately thrives on a vision of a private possession, something that is all mine and not
at all yours? As discussed at length in my book, why sustain a view of agency that
acquires its meaning by virtue of its opposite, namely determination? Let us suspend this
traditional binary; it is not one that is essential to our going on together. Rather, let us
replace the problematic concept of free agency, with that of the person as the common
intersection of multiple relations. What enables or invites us to move in one direction as
opposed to another is not, then, some Doppelganger lodged behind the eyeballs, but our
participation in multiple relational traditions. Each tradition lives through and with us,
offering or compelling an alternative form of action. Ultimately we are neither free nor
constrained, on this account, but with each new relationship in which we participate, we
expand the domain of possible action.
I could go on at length about whether, as Sugarman and Martin say, my account
denies the significance of first person experience of the self, and whether I have
somehow been garroted by a “mereological fallacy.” Very briefly, in the first case, I
reiterate: the constructionist orientation from which this work emanates neither denies or
asserts anything as true or real. The challenge for me, however, has been to demonstrate
how we can understand what we call first person experience as a relational phenomenon.
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As I propose, for example, virtually all our experience of pleasure and pain is colored by
the relational traditions in which we participate. Turning to the mereological fallacy, said
to be assigning to parts of a person’s abilities or powers what properly applies to the
entire person (e.g. “my brain made me do it”), I must admit that I do not see this as a
logical fallacy so much as metaphoric bending of the language—common to many forms
of explanation. More to the point, could we not argue that assigning powers and abilities
to an individual person is just such a “fallacy?” On the relational view, there are no truly
individual actors; we are always already constituents of relationship. To say that “I
decided” is to misappropriate for the self what more properly is an outcome of
relationship.
Slife and Richardson (2011) complete this set of engaging discussions with what
is surely the most surprising question: Is my account indeed relational enough? My
answer in this case is both “yes” and “no,” but the issues are not so simple. My
commentators are quite correct in the surmise that I abandon the dualism that has plagued
philosophy and contributed to individualist ideology. As I propose, let us replace subject
and object separation with an inseparable and mutually defining subject/object. However,
they go on to say that my constructionist orientation thus creates a new monism, an intersubjective reality that denies the very real existence of mountains, and I suspect every
other thing we would call a material reality. Well…not quite. First, my view of
constructionism does not deny anything; as proposed some time ago (Gergen, 1994),
constructionism is “ontologically mute.” However, constructionism does propose that
whatever we take to be mountains and all the rest are both possible and optional
interpretations of our existence. For example, most maps of the world—assiduous
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attempts to be as accurate as possible—will reveal no mountains and no curvature of the
earth. For many purposes, such maps are very useful. It is not that “what there is”
requires an ontology in which mountains exist, but that in our various pursuits we may
often (but not always) find it useful to speak of mountains.
Now, with this said in defense of my constructionist background, I do agree with
Slife and Richardson regarding the limits of my case for relational being. Essentially, I
have limited the discussion almost exclusively to relational processes among people. In
this sense, I have created these social processes as privileged realities within the space of
this project. To be intelligible and to favor a course of action virtually requires such
limiting. (Consider my response to Churchill’s concern with “the whole carpet.”)
However, as I mention in the last chapter of the book—and thus agreeing with Slife and
Richardson—it would be useful and desirable to extend this account of relational being to
what we commonly construct as the physical environment. Most inviting would be an
extension of the concept of co-action to include nature and earth. In what ways can we
view the relationship between human action and the natural world as collaborative? How
can we see this relationship as dialogic and mutually constituting? By thus extending the
logic of co-action, the thesis of relational being could join the global efforts toward a
sustainable world.
Are these rejoinders to my colleagues sufficient; do they constitute the final word
on these matters? Scarcely. Whatever they mean will depend on what you, the reader,
now does with them. They will become something quite different, I suspect, as my dear
colleagues now take them on.
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